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A B S T R A C T
This study investigates whether some audit quality attributes are capable to restrict earnings management
in a developing country, Jordan, whose cultural, economic and institutional context is very different from
most previously analyzed countries context. Generalized least square regression (GLS) was used to study
the association between two audit quality attributes (auditor size and audit fees) and discretionary accruals,
as a proxy of earnings management, for a sample of industrial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange
during the period 2012 2016. The findings are consistent with the expectation that in emerging countries
external audit can function differently from that in Anglo-Saxon and West-European countries with regard
to its role in restricting earnings management and indicate that, given the institutional environment in
Jordan, auditor size and audit fees have no significant effect on earnings management. This study provides
readers with information about if and how the institutional setting influences the relationship between audit
quality and earnings management. Furthermore, it presents new evidence regarding the moderating effect
of the level of audit fees on their relation with earnings management. This studys findings could provide
valuable information to regulators and standards setters, both in Jordan and other countries with a similar
economic and institutional environment, which can help in preventing earnings management practices.
©2020 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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¿Influye la calidad de la auditoría en la gestión de resultados en los mercados
emergentes? Evidencia de Jordania
R E S U M E N
Este estudio investiga si algunos atributos de la calidad de auditoría son capaces de restringir la manipu-
lación de resultados en un país en desarrollo, Jordania, cuyo contexto cultural, económico e institucional
es muy diferente del contexto de los países analizados anteriormente. Se usó la regresión de mínimos
cuadrados generalizada (GLS) para estudiar la asociación entre dos atributos de la calidad de auditoría
(tamaño del auditor y honorarios de auditoría) y los ajustes por devengos discrecionales, como proxy de
la manipulación de resultados, para una muestra de empresas industriales que cotizan en la Bolsa de
valores de Amman durante el período 2012 - 2016. Los resultados son consistentes con la expectativa
de que en los países emergentes la auditoría externa puede funcionar de manera diferente a la de los
países anglosajones y de Europa occidental con respecto a su papel en la restricción de la manipulación de
resultados e indican que, dado el entorno institucional en Jordania, el tamaño del auditor y los honorarios
de auditoría no tienen un efecto significativo en la manipulación de resultados. Este estudio proporciona a
los lectores información sobre si y cómo el entorno institucional influye en la relación entre la calidad de
la auditoría y la manipulación de resultados. Además, presenta nueva evidencia sobre el efecto moderador
del nivel de los honorarios de auditoría en su relación con la manipulación de resultados. Los resultados
de este estudio podrían proporcionar información valiosa a los reguladores, tanto en Jordania como en
otros países con un entorno económico e institucional similar, para prevenir las prácticas de manipulación
de resultados.
©2020 ASEPUC. Publicado por EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. Este es un artículo Open Access bajo la
licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
https://www.doi.org/10.6018/rcsar.365091
1138-4891/©2020 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
The recent corporate accounting scandals have sparked in-
terest in the role of auditing in ensuring both the soundness
of financial statements and the quality of reported earnings
(Lin and Hwang, 2010) and have raised doubts about the
quality of external auditing and its ability to restrict earnings
management (Velury, 2003). As a result, many studies have
analyzed the association between audit quality and earnings
management. However, most of those studies are based on
data from Anglo-Saxon countries and West-European coun-
tries and provide inconsistent evidence (Lin and Hwang,
2010). Previous studies have noted that differences in cul-
tural, economic, institutional and legal factors among coun-
tries can affect both earnings quality (Leuz et al., 2003,
Dechow et al., 2010; Enomoto et al., 2015) and the role of
auditing in restraining earnings management (Maijoor and
Vanstraelen, 2006; Choi and Wong, 2007; Lin and Hwang,
2010). Therefore, a plausible explanation of the prior re-
search’s mixed findings could lie in country-level factors.
In developing countries the level of investors’ protection
and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms
provided by firms to market participants are different from
those in developed countries (Berkowitz et al., 2003; Iatridis,
2012; Bao and Lewellyn, 2017), which, in turn, encourages
earnings management (Li et al., 2014). In this regard, Leuz
et al. (2003) noted that earnings management is usually pre-
valent in those countries with less-developed stock markets,
weak investor protection, concentrated ownership and weak
legal enforcement. Similarly, the findings of Pacheco Paredes
and Wheatley (2017) associated earnings management with
cultures characterized by high power distance and higher
levels of collectivism, typically characteristics of many emer-
ging markets. Li et al. (2014) and Bao and Lewellyn (2017)
also observed that earnings management activity tends to be
higher in emerging countries compared to developed mar-
kets. Additionally, the efficacy of some audit quality attrib-
utes in constraining earnings management has been found
more pronounced in certain countries than in others (Fran-
cis and Wang, 2008). Thus, this paper aims to shed light on
the extent to which audit quality is capable to restrict earn-
ings management in a developing country, Jordan, whose
cultural, economic and institutional context is very different
from most previously analyzed countries’ context.
The Jordanian institutional setting is characterized by a
code law tradition, weak investor protection and a small pro-
portion of quoted firms (Francis and Wang, 2008; Abdullatif
and Al-Khadash, 2010; Abdullatif, 2016). Additionally, own-
ership structure is concentrated and usually tied to members
of the same family. In terms of audit quality, the Jordanian
audit market offers an attractive setting to be studied for
several reasons. First, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon na-
tions, the risk of litigation and punishments for abuser aud-
itors is lower (Abdullatif and Al-Khadash, 2010). Second,
financial bonding and personal relations between auditors
and their clients are widespread and affect the auditor selec-
tion (World Bank, 2004; Abdullatif and Al-Khadash, 2010;
Shbeilat and Abdel-Qader, 2018). Finally, the concentrated
ownership structure of Jordanian firms causes a low demand
for high-quality external audits and, consequently, audit fees
are significantly lower compared with contexts characterized
by dispersed ownership (Abdullatif and Al-Khadash, 2010;
Niskanen et al., 2011). Previously, research has shown that
earnings management behavior is widespread among Jord-
anian companies (Al-khabash and Al-Thuneibat, 2008; Al-
Mousawi and Al-Thuneibat, 2011). Therefore, examining the
association between audit quality and earnings management
in the Jordanian context could provide valuable information
about the role of external auditing in preventing earnings
management in a cultural, economic, and institutional con-
text very different from developed countries.
This study posits that in this context external auditing
can function differently from that in Anglo-Saxon and West-
European countries with regard to its role in restricting earn-
ings management. In order to investigate how external audit-
ing can restrict earnings management practices, two proxies
for audit quality were considered: audit firm size (Big Four
vs non-Big Four) and audit fees. Data were gathered from the
annual reports of a sample of Jordanian industrial firms lis-
ted on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period
2012–2016. The regression results show that there is no in-
fluence for audit firm size in mitigating the level of earnings
management, suggesting that there may be no differences
in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit-
ors in Jordan. In addition, the findings indicate that there
is no association between audit fees and earnings manage-
ment, suggesting that audit fees may not provide incentives
for auditors to prevent or allow earnings management.
Empirical evidence on Jordan is limited. Al-Mousawi and
Al-Thuneibat (2011) found that Big Four and non-Big Four
audit firms are not significantly different in their ability to
restrict earnings management practices. In a similar way, Al-
Thuneibat et al. (2011) observed that audit firm size does not
affect the negative effect of longer audit firm tenure on audit
quality and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. The
data used in both of these studies was from 2002 to 2006, be-
fore the global financial crisis and the corporate governance
code and related regulationsmentioned earlier being enacted
in Jordan. Based on data from 86 industrial firms listed on
the ASE during the period 2007-2010, Alzoubi (2016) repor-
ted evidence that audit quality negatively affects earnings
management. The data for this study come later such studies
and after development of detailed corporate governance reg-
ulations in Jordan; so, to some extent, it attempts to explore
whether the development of such regulations has achieved
its intended aims of better corporate governance and share-
holder protection in Jordan or not.
Thus, this paper aims to contribute to the existing liter-
ature on audit quality and earnings management in several
ways. First, it provides data from a developing country with
cultural, economic and social characteristics very different
from those of most analyzed countries. Thus, this study’s
findings could enrich the understanding on the link between
audit quality and earnings management across different in-
stitutional contexts and, specifically, to further learn if and
how the institutional setting influences such a relationship.
Hence, empirical evidence from this study can offer pertin-
ent and valuable insights to the current debate regarding
the effectiveness of external auditing in emerging markets.
Second, this study’s findings could provide valuable inform-
ation to regulators and auditing standards setters, both in
Jordan and other countries with a similar economic and in-
stitutional environment, in order to restrict earnings manage-
ment. In the case of emerging markets, the reforms in finan-
cial reporting, auditing and corporate governance have been
inspired by those introduced in developed countries, whose
economic and institutional characteristics are different. In
this sense, a better understanding of audit effectiveness in
developing countries could help regulators to assess the im-
pact of the planned reforms and to develop more effective
legislation to enhance reported earnings’ quality in emerging
markets.
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The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows: the next
section briefly outlines the development of the auditing pro-
fession in Jordan. Section 3 reviews the extant literature and
develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the re-
search design, including the sample, data sources and the
measurement of variables. Section 5 reports and discusses
the empirical results. Section 6 includes robustness checks
of the findings. Finally, the main conclusions of the study as
well as its limitations and some ideas for future research are
presented in Section 7.
2. Development of the auditing profession in Jordan
The auditing profession in Jordan has passed through sev-
eral stages, each with relevant features, where the profession
was influenced by the prevailing conditions and legislation at
each stage. Historically, the beginnings of the auditing profes-
sion in Jordan can be dated back to 1944 (Abdullah, 1982),
although until the beginning of 1960s the practice of auditing
was not regulated. In 1961 the Law of Practicing the Auditing
Profession No. 10 was enacted and it introduced a licensing
mechanism for entry to the auditing profession by establish-
ing some general prerequisites for practicing auditing, but
otherwise not much was mentioned regarding auditors’ du-
ties or rights (Abdullah, 1982). This law was revised in 1985
and the Law of Auditing Profession - Law No. 32 - was is-
sued, which updated the conditions to be fulfilled to obtain
an audit practice license as well as the rights and duties of
external auditors. Furthermore, this law allowed auditors to
joint into an association which contributed to developing the
auditing profession (Solas, 1994). Under regulations related
to this law, in 1987 the Jordanian Association of Certified
Public Accountants (JACPA) was instituted.
The development of the audit profession in Jordan was
fostered by the issuance of the Company Law No. 22 of 1997
and the Securities Law No. 76 of 2002. These laws rule the
corporate financial reporting framework in Jordan and re-
quire the adoption of IFRS and ISAs (Al-Akra et al., 2009).
The first one established the obligation to audit the annual re-
ports and addressed matters such as the election of auditors,
auditors’ independence, remuneration, duties and liabilities.
Furthermore, under regulations issued in 1998 in relation to
the Companies Law of 1997, the International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS) and the International Standards on
Auditing (ISA) were formally adopted in Jordan for the first
time. More recently, the Jordanian Corporate Governance
Code (2008) and the last update for the regulations issued
by the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) in 2017 cover
many issues relating to the conditions to be met by audit-
ors in order to reinforce their independence. Specifically, the
first one bans external auditors from providing additional ser-
vices (i.e. technical consultation, administrative support or
internal audit services) to their auditees.
The Jordanian audit market is mostly made up of small
firms, although numerous international audit firms, includ-
ing the Big Four, also practice in Jordan, using their own
name or in association with a Jordanian audit firm (Ab-
dullatif and Al-Khadash, 2010; Abdullatif, 2016). The prac-
tice of auditing is affected by two main characteristics of the
Jordanian market. First, the vast majority of Jordanian firms
are not publicly listed and, therefore, the Jordanian capital
market is relatively small and inefficient with limited trade
activity. Second, the Jordanian market is mainly comprised
of family firms, and therefore there is reduced separation
between management and ownership. These characterist-
ics generate a low demand for the quality of external audit-
ing which, in turn, causes a high competition among audit
firms and lower audit fees. Furthermore, the risk of litigation
against auditors is also low, contributing to higher possibil-
ities of lower quality external auditing practice (Abdullatif
and Al-Khadash, 2016). Furthermore, Jordan is somewhat
a collectivist society (Al-Akra et al., 2009), where personal
relations between clients and auditors are strong and play a
significant role in the election of a company’s auditor (World
Bank, 2004; Abdullatif and Al-Khadash, 2010).
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
Prior literature has used different proxies to measure audit
quality. This section provides a review of the literature that
has examined the relationship between audit quality and
earnings management, considering two input-based proxies
for audit quality: audit size and audit fees.
3.1. Auditor size and earnings management
Audit firm size, usually defined by using a Big N vs. non-
Big N dichotomy, is one of the most common proxies for audit
quality in auditing literature (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).
Research found that big audit firms can constrain earnings
management in the USA (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al.,
1999; Chung et al., 2003; Lin and Hwang, 2010), where
there are effective mechanisms to control auditors, but they
may fail in preventing earnings management practices where
the institutional setting does not promote high-quality audits
(Jeong and Rho, 2004; Francis and Wang, 2008). Indeed,
several non-US studies have found no difference between
Big N and non-Big N firms in deterring earnings manage-
ment (Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003; Jeong and Rho, 2004;
Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004; Piot and Janin,
2007). These findings have been explained based on several
arguments. First, in those countries where the legal environ-
ment does not encourage high-quality audits because the risk
of litigation is low or there are no effective disciplinary mech-
anisms to control opportunistic behaviors, Big N auditors
and non-Big N auditors may provide comparable audit qual-
ity (Jeong and Rho, 2004; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006;
Francis and Wang, 2008). Second, since Big N and non-Big
N firms are subjected to the same standards and legislation,
both should provide a similar audit quality (Lawrence et al.,
2011). Finally, in some cases small firms may even be more
capable than their larger peers of detecting irregularities due
to their greater knowledge of local markets (Louis, 2005).
In this respect, by using data from listed firms in three
European countries (the UK, France, and Germany), Maijoor
and Vanstraelen (2006) observed that Big N audit quality is
not similar across different audit environment regimes. Spe-
cifically, they found that Big N audit firms were significantly
superior to smaller audit firms in restricting earningsmanage-
ment in the UK, but not in France or Germany. In a similar
way, Francis and Wang (2008) analyzed whether Big N audit
firms behavior varies depending on the strictness of investor
protection regimes. They analyzed a sample of firms from 42
countries and found that in weak investor protection regimes
the quality of the firms’ earnings was the same regardless of
the size of their audit firm.
In developing countries investor protection is weaker than
that in developed countries (Enomoto et al., 2015; Bao and
Lewellyn, 2017). In such an institutional environment, aud-
itors are less likely to exhibit a high level of independence
(Jeong and Rho, 2004) and provide high-quality audits (Choi
andWong, 2007). Therefore, in such countries, there may be
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no differences in audit quality between Big N and non-Big N
auditors (Francis and Wang, 2008). Furthermore, as indic-
ated earlier, in Jordan, the litigation risk and penalties for
auditors who abuse law are low (Abdullatif and Al-Khadash,
2010). Consequently, Big Four auditors arguably have lim-
ited motivation to exert effort in detecting problems and can
be less strict on the misreporting of earnings by their clients.
As indicated earlier, the limited empirical evidence on the
association between audit firm size and earnings manage-
ment in Jordan is mixed. Al-Mousawi and Al-Thuneibat
(2011) and Al-Thuneibat et al. (2011) found that Big Four
and non-Big Four audit firms are not significantly different
in their ability to restrict earnings management practices,
whereas Alzoubi (2016) documented a negative significant
association between auditor size and earnings management.
However, considering the characteristics of the Jordanian
business context, it is hypothesized that there are no differ-
ences in earnings quality of Jordanian firms audited by Big
Four and non-Big Four audit firms and, thus, the following
hypothesis is stated:
H1: Given the institutional environment in Jordan,
the size of the audit firm (Big Four vs. non-Big Four)
is not related to the level of earnings management.
3.2. Audit fees and earnings management
Two opposing arguments exist in the literature concerning
the relationship between audit fees and earnings manage-
ment. On one hand, high audit fees could threaten the in-
dependence of auditors and create an economic tie between
an audit firm and its clients, creating motivations for audit-
ors to allow earnings management (DeAngelo, 1981) (Beck
et al., 1988) (Eshleman and Guo, 2014) (Magee and Tseng,
1990). On the other hand, high audit fees are related with
higher audit effort and stronger scrutiny which lead to higher
earnings quality (Srinidhi and Gul, 2007) (Gul et al., 2003;
Lin and Hwang, 2010; Alali, 2011). Further, high audit fees
are linked with audit firms’ reputational capital, and, there-
fore, high audit fees provide a deterrent for auditors to allow
earnings management (Frankel et al., 2002).
Empirical evidence on the relationship between audit fees
and earnings management is mixed (Lin and Hwang, 2010).
Several studies confirm the first argument regarding the ex-
istence of a positive relationship between audit fees and earn-
ings management (Gul et al., 2003; Antle et al., 2006; Choi
et al., 2010; Alali, 2011; Sharma et al., 2011; Gu and Hu,
2015; Donatella et al., 2018), whereas other studies sup-
port the second argument and document a negative associ-
ation between them (Frankel et al., 2002; Srinidhi and Gul,
2007). Finally, some studies found that there is no associ-
ation between audit fees and earnings management (Ash-
baugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003). Regarding
developing countries, (Martinez and Moraes (2017)) docu-
ment a negative association between audit fees and earnings
management in the Brazilian market. These mixed findings
can be caused by differences in economic conditions, audit
markets and regulatory environments across countries (Mai-
joor and Vanstraelen, 2006). In this sense, Gu and Hu (2015)
found that audit fees vary depending on the litigation envir-
onment, being higher in environments where litigation risk
is higher. Junjian and Dan (2015) also observed that strong
investor protection regimes have a moderating effect on the
positive relationship between audit fees and earnings man-
agement.
The small Jordanian stock market offers a limited client
base to audit firms. Furthermore, there are no grave con-
sequences for companies switching auditors (Abdullatif and
Al-Khadash 2010; Abdullatif 2016). In such a context, audit
firms are subjected to competitive pressures to retain their
clients, especially if their audit fees are relatively high, and
they would therefore be willing to permit some discretion
in reporting earnings by clients (Sharma et al., 2011). This
situation, coupled with the low litigation risk in Jordan, leads
to an expectation of positive association between audit fees
and earnings management. Therefore, this study proposes
the following hypothesis:
H2: Given the institutional environment in Jordan,
audit fees are positively associated with the level of
earnings management.
4. Research methodology
4.1. Sample and data collection
The sample for this study consists of all the industrial
firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during
the period 2012-2016. The industrial sector was chosen be-
cause of its importance to the Jordanian economy, as it dir-
ectly contributes to about a quarter of the national economy.
Financial and insurance companies were excluded from the
sample since they are subjected to dissimilar regulatory and
procedural requirements. Furthermore, they apply distinct-
ive accounting practices and, therefore, capturing opportun-
istic earnings manipulations is more difficult (Peasnell et al.,
2000; Chen et al., 2005). Service companies were also ex-
cluded due to their different nature that could distort the res-
ults.
The initial sample included 395 firm-year observations
from 2012 to 2016. However, 144 observations were ex-
cluded because they belonged tomerged and liquidated firms
or firms that did not have an available annual report. Thus,
the final sample consists of 251 firm-year observations. The
main source of data was the sample firms’ annual reports
published on the ASE’s website corresponding to the period
2012-2016. This small sample size, similar than that of Alves
(2013) and Alzoubi (2016), can be attributed to the charac-
teristics of the Jordanian stock market. Data was obtained
from the firms’ annual reports available on the ASE’s website,
which were manually searched and analyzed by the research-
ers.
4.2. Measurement of Variables
Dependent variable: Earnings management
Several models can be used to measure earnings manage-
ment. Most of them use discretionary accruals as a proxy
for earnings management (Niu, 2006; Chang and Sun, 2009;
Jaggi et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2010; Sun and Liu, 2011). Fol-
lowing prior research, this study employs the Kothari et al.’s
(2005) performance adjusted model to estimate discretion-
ary accruals due to its higher power of discovery of earnings
management and fewer misspecification problems.
The discretionary accruals (DACKO) are calculated em-
ploying a cross-sectional variation of the performance adjus-
ted model by Kothari et al. (2005), as it is more suitable for
small samples.
As shown in equation (1), all variables, except the con-
stant, are deflated by the total assets at the end of the previ-
ous year in order to adjust the differences in firm size and to
reduce problems of heteroskedasticity.
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TAi,t /Ai,t-1 = α0,t + α1,t (1/Ai,t-1)+ α2,t (∆(SALES – REC)i,t
/Ai,t-1) + α3,t (PPEi,t /Ai,t-1) + α4,t (ROAi,t /Ai,t-1) + ϵt (1)
where TAi,t are the total accruals for firm i in period t; Ai,t–1
are the total assets for firm i in period t; ∆(SALES – REC)i,t
represents the change in sales less accounts receivable for
firm i in period t; PPEi,t reflects the property, plant and equip-
ment for firm i in period t; and ROAi,t is the return on assets
for firm i in period t.
The non-discretionary accruals (NDACKO) are calculated
by substituting the coefficients in equation (2) for the coeffi-
cients obtained from equation (1):
NDACKOi,t = a0,t + a1,t (1/Ai,t-1)+ a2,t (∆(SALES – REC)i,t
/Ai,t-1) + a3,t (PPEi,t /Ai,t-1) + a4,t (ROAi,t /Ai,t-1) + ϵt (2)
Finally, the discretionary accruals (DACKO) are calculated
by subtracting the non-discretionary accruals (equation 2)
from the total accruals (equation 1), as shown in equation
(3).
DACKOit = TAit – NDACKOit (3)
Given that this research focuses on the magnitude rather
than a particular direction of earningsmanagement, the abso-
lute value of discretionary accruals is utilized as the depend-
ent variable (see Beck et al., 1988; Ianniello, 2015; Albers-
mann and Hohenfels, 2017).
Independent variables: Audit quality proxies
Audit firm size: Auditor Size (AUDSIZE) is defined as a
dichotomous variable which receives the value of 1 if the fin-
ancial statements of the firm i in the period t were audited
by a Big Four audit firm and zero otherwise.
Audit fees: Consistent with former empirical studies (Gul
et al., 2003; Alali, 2011; Lin et al., 2018), audit fees (AFEE)
are defined as the natural logarithm of audit fees.
Control variables
In line with prior literature, several variables were in-
cluded in the model, which reflect firm characteristics and
earnings management incentives.
Firm size: firm size has often been used by earlier earnings
management research as a control variable. Although Watts
and Zimmerman (1990) and Jeong and Rho (2004) indic-
ate that larger firms tend to manipulate earnings to report
more predictable earnings, some other studies (Krishnan,
2003; Park and Shin, 2004; Piot and Janin, 2007; Sánchez-
Ballesta and García-Meca, 2007) document that large firms
participate to a lower degree in earnings management. The
mixed findings suggest no directional signs for the relation-
ship between firm size and earnings management. Firm size
(SIZE) is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets.
Firm leverage: many studies found that financially troubled
firms tend to manage earnings downwards to take advant-
age of restructuring debt (DeAngelo et al., 1994; Becker et
al., 1998; Jaggi and Lee, 2002; Jeong and Rho, 2004). How-
ever, another view is that highly leveraged firms will be under
close scrutiny from their lenders, thus decreasing earnings
management (Park and Shin, 2004). Due to such varying
scenarios, the sign for the relation between firm leverage and
earnings management is not predicted. Leverage (LEVERG)
is measured as total long-term debt divided by total assets.
Firm growth: consistent with previous studies that docu-
mented a positive relation between the firm’s growth rate and
earningsmanagement (Menon andWilliams, 2004; Gul et al.,
2009; Sáenz-González and García-Meca, 2014; Albersmann
and Hohenfels, 2017), this study also predicts a positive sign
in such a relationship. Firm growth (GROW) is measured as
the market to book value ratio.
Firm performance: some authors argue that firms with
lower performance have more motivation to manage earn-
ings (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). However, other stud-
ies (DeGeorge et al., 1999) found that firms performing
highly tend to manage their earnings figures. Therefore, this
study anticipates a relationship between firm performance
and earnings management, but the sign of such a relation-
ship is not predicted. Financial performance is measured by
the Return on Assets (ROA) ratio, computed as net income
divided by total assets.
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the variables em-
ployed in this study.
Table 1
Summary of variable measurementTable 1: Summary of variable measurement 
Variable Abbreviation Definition 
Earnings 
management 
DACKO The absolute value of the discretionary accruals 
estimated following Kothari et al.’s (2005) model 
Auditor size AUDSIZE Dummy variable which assumes the value of 1 if the 
firm is audited by a Big Four auditor and 0 otherwise. 
Audit fees AFEE The natural logarithm of audit fees. 
Firm Size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Firm Leverage LEVERG Total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Growth GROW The market to book value ratio 
Performance ROA The net income divided by the total assets 
 	
4.3. Model
To test the proposed hypotheses, the following multiple
regression model was estimated:
DACKOi,t = β0 + β1 AUDSIZEi,t + β2 AFEEi,t + β3
LEVERGi,t+ β4 SIZEi,t + β5 GROWi,t + β6 ROAi,t + ϵi,t (4)
Generalized least square regression (GLS) was used to
study the association between audit quality attributes and
earnings management. The present study contains both
cross-sectional and time series data throughout the 251 firm-
year observations of firms listed on the ASE during the period
from 2012 to 2016.
5. Results analysis and discussion
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables em-
ployed in the regression analysis for the full sample of 251
firm-year observations over the period 2012-2016. The table
is separated into three panels. The descriptive statistics for
continuous and dichotomous variables for the full sample are
summarized in panels A and B, respectively. Panel C displays
the descriptive statistics categorized by audit firm size.
Panel A in Table 2 shows that the absolute values of discre-
tionary accruals, estimated utilizing the Kothari et al. (2005)
model (DACKO), have a mean (median) of 0.079 (0.054)
and a standard deviation of 0.08, indicating that the total
volume of earnings management is 7.9% (5.4%) of lagged
total assets. These values are comparable with prior evidence
from Jordan (Alzoubi, 2016) and other developing coun-
tries (Habbash and Alghamdi, 2017) as well as that from
developed countries with weak investor protection regimes
(Othman and Zeghal, 2006; Ianniello, 2015).
Regarding the independent variables, Panel B in Table 2 re-
ports that Big Four auditors audit 26.7% of the sample com-
panies, while companies audited by non-Big Four firms rep-
resent about 73.3% of the sample. Furthermore, panel C in
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Table 2 indicates that the proportion of audit fees paid to Big
Four firms by their clients has a mean (median) of 4.3365
(4.0792) with a standard deviation of 0.4605. However, the
proportion of audit fees paid to the non-Big Four firms by
their clients has a mean (median) of 3.8804 (3.8891) with a
standard deviation of 0.2093. This result is consistent with
empirical evidence obtained by Choi et al (2008) that Big
Four audit firms earn fees premium.
Regarding control variables, panel C in Table 2 displays
that clients of Big Four audit firms are larger in size (mean =
7.51), leverage (mean = 41.21) and growth (mean = 9.16)
but have a small ROA (mean = -1.0552) compared to clients
of non-Big Four audit firms.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables (full sample N = 251) 
Variable Mean SD Min P50 Max 
DACKO 0.07958 0.08296 0.00041 0.05447 0.52698 
AFEE 4.00251 0.35932 3 3.92942 5.27221 
LEVERG 33.6211 22.8215 0.39982 30.2928 115.468 
SIZE 7.23888 0.63189 5.46952 7.20824 9.08331 
GROW 3.4533 31.5135 -8.4 1.02143 500.134 
ROA 0.85876 10.6741 -79.328 0.84775 40.3836 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics – Dichotomous Variables 
Variable Frequency of 1’s (Yes) Frequency of 0’s (No) Percentage of 1’s 
(Yes) 
Percentage of 0’s 
(No) 
AUDSIZE 67 184 26.70% 73.30% 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables by audit firm size 
Variable 
Big Four (N = 69) Non-Big Four (N = 186) 
Mean SD Min P50 Max Mean SD Min P50 Max 
DACKO 0.0791 0.0856 0.0007 0.0522 0.4495 0.0787 0.0811 0.0004 0.0543 0.527 
AFEE 4.3365 0.4605 3.699 4.0792 5.2722 3.8804 0.2093 3 3.8891 4.2553 
LEVERG 41.212 22.865 6.639 39.839 99.815 30.886 22.237 0.3998 27.286 115.46 
SIZE 7.5096 0.8645 5.4695 7.3661 9.0833 7.1414 0.4911 5.8608 7.1786 8.0799 
GROW 9.1597 60.918 0 1.1066 500.13 1.3978 3.5747 -8.4 0.993 45.429 
ROA -1.055 15.073 -79.33 1.0147 18.659 1.5482 8.5053 -28.37 0.8039 40.383 
 	
5.2. Correlation matrix
Table 3 shows the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the vari-
ables analyzed in this study. It shows that, whilst there are
numerous statistically significant correlations among the ex-
planatory variables, none of them are highly correlated, so it
can be stated that there is no multicollinearity issue with the
results. Besides, variance inflation factors (VIF) are low (all
values are under 0.8), confirming the above conclusion.
A review of correlation coefficients in Table 3 highlights
several observations. First, the level of discretionary accru-
als (DACKO) is negatively correlated with audit fees but the
correlations are not very strong, while it is positively correl-
ated with auditor size. Second, in terms of the control vari-
ables, firm leverage (LEVERG) and firm growth (GROW) are
positively associated with the level of discretionary accruals
(DACKO), while firm size (SIZE) and firm performance (ROA)
are not.
It is worth mentioning that one of the highest correlations
found is between the auditor size (AUDSIZE) and audit fees
(AFEE): 0.569 (at a level of significance of 0.01). This cor-
relation is expected, as it suggests that larger auditor size
implies charging higher audit fees. This result is in line with
evidence reported by Choi et al. (2008). Another high cor-
relation was found between audit fees (AFEE) and firm size
(SIZE): 0.682 (at a level of significance of 0.01), indicating
that large clients tend to pay high audit fees.
Table 3
Pearson’s correlation matrixTable 3: Pearson’s correlation matrix 
 DACKO AUDSIZE AFEE LEVERG SIZE GROW ROA VIF 
DACKO 1        
AUDSIZE 0.007 1      1.65 
AFEE -0.140* 0.569*** 1     2.78 
LEVERG 0.087 0.200** 0.1 1    1.1 
SIZE -0.296*** -0.254*** 0.682*** 0.130* 1   2.27 
GROW 0.235*** 0.109 -0.006 0.183** -0.022 1  1.12 
ROA -0.042 -0.109 0.102 -0.103 0.328*** -0.267*** 1 1.28 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*** Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 	
5.3. Regression Results
Table 4 reports the findings of GLS regressions of audit
quality attributes (auditor size and audit fees) and discre-
tionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. As the
dataset is in panel frame, the Hausman test was run to decide
which model is best fitted to the data (the fixed effects (OLS)
versus random effects (GLS)). The value was not significant
(P = 0.7162) and, therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected. Hence, the random effects model is considered as
the most appropriate for this study.
Model 1 documents the basic model, which has only con-
trol variables incorporated in the formula, while the inde-
pendent variables, auditor size and audit fees, are separately
included in models 2 and 3, respectively. In addition, model
4 combines all the explanatory variables namely: auditor size
and audit fees and control variables.
Table 4 reveals that models 2 and 4 have similar findings
for the auditor size variable (the coefficient β1 is positive and
not significant), which means that audit firms (Big Four and
non-Big Four) are not successful in limiting earnings man-
agement in the Jordanian setting. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is ac-
cepted. This result is consistent with the existing evidence
in countries such as Korea (Jeong and Rho, 2004), Belgium
(Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004) and Greece (Tsi-
pouridou and Spathis, 2012), which reports that there is no
difference between auditors, either Big N or non-Big N, in
reducing the level of earnings management.
A possible explanation for this outcome may be based on
the argument of Jeong and Rho (2004), who propose that
in countries, such as Jordan, where the legal environment
does not encourage high-quality audits and the risk of litig-
ation is low, auditors are not motivated to restrict earnings
management behavior. Thus, this finding extends and rein-
forces Maijoor and Vanstraelen’s (2006) findings that the Big
N audit quality effect depends on the country’s legal tradition
and investor protection regime.
Another plausible reason of this result could be found in
that Big Four audit quality is not unchanged across offices
(Francis and Yu, 2009) and “local idiosyncrasies” affect aud-
itors’ work (Belal et al., 2017). In this sense, our result con-
firms some authors’ view (e.g. Abdullatif and Al-Khadash,
2010; Abdullatif, 2016) that in developing countries, like
Jordan, Big Four audit firmsmay not be capable to apply their
audit procedures and approaches uniformly.
With reference to Hypothesis 2, Table 4 reports that mod-
els 3 and 4 have similar results for the audit fees variable (the
coefficient β2 is positive and not significant). This indicates
that audit fees may not motivate restricting earnings man-
agement. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected. This finding contra-
dicts Sharma et al.’s (2011) results, which indicate that there
is a positive relationship between a client’s economic import-
ance and earnings management in New Zealand. It also con-
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tradicts previous evidence from developing countries regard-
ing a negative relationship between audit fees and earnings
management (Martinez and Moraes, 2017).
This result can be explained considering that the level of
audit fees in Jordan is comparatively much lower than that in
developed countries and even that in other countries in the
Middle East region (Abdullatif and Al-Khadash, 2010). Con-
sequently, given the low level of audit fees in Jordan, coupled
with the low litigation risk, it is likely that audit fees do not
constitute a motivation to accomplish more audit effort to re-
strict earnings management and, therefore, audit fees do not
affect earnings quality.
Taking the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2 together, it can be
said that audit quality attributes (auditor size and audit fees)
do not affect the level of earnings management by Jordanian
firms. This result can be attributed to the characteristics of
the Jordanian institutional and economic setting that does
not encourage auditors to provide high-quality audits.
For the control variables, the findings in Table 4 reveal that,
in all models, the coefficient of firm size (SIZE) has a negat-
ive sign and is highly significant, suggesting that the smaller
firms tend to tolerate more earning manipulations. This find-
ing is consistent with preceding literature (Albersmann and
Hohenfels, 2017; Alzoubi, 2016; Chi et al., 2015; Francis
and Wang, 2008). In the second place, the coefficient of firm
growth (GROW) has, as anticipated, a positive sign and is
significant, suggesting that larger levels of growth may en-
courage managers to use aggressive earnings management
practices. This finding is in line with prior research (Carcello
and Nagy, 2004; Alzoubi, 2016; Albersmann and Hohenfels,
2017; Sáenz-González and García-Meca, 2014). In the third
place, in columns 3 and 4 the coefficient of firm perform-
ance (ROA) shows a significant positive sign, indicating that
firms with high performance are more likely to manage their
earnings figures. This result is consistent with earlier studies
in developing countries (Sáenz-González and García-Meca,
2014). Finally, our findings do not show any significant influ-
ence of firm leverage (LEVERG) on earnings management.
The goodness-of-fit (R-square) is around 0.171 for all
models, which is comparable with those in related research
(e.g. Chi et al. (2015), who obtained an R-square of 18%).
Table 4
GLS regression resultsTable 4: GLS regression results 
Variables Predicted 
sign. 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
AUDSIZE No  0.0157  0.00489 
 (1.24)  (0.36) 
AFEE +   0.0352 0.0313 
  (1.51) (1.24) 
LEVERG ? 0.000335 0.00029 0.000339 0.000322 
(1.02) (0.86) (1.05) (0.98) 
SIZE ? -0.0475*** -0.0506*** -0.0615*** 0.0610*** 
(-3.99) (-4.14) (-3.53) (-3.50) 
GROW + 0.000659*** 0.000655*** 0.000670*** 0.000668*** 
(10.02) (9.94) (9.78) (9.71) 
ROA ? 0.00121 0.00131 0.00137* 0.00138* 
(1.88) (1.96) (1.99) (2.00) 
CONSTANT  0.408*** 0.429*** 0.368*** 0.380*** 
(4.68) (4.84) (5.01) (4.83) 
R2  0.166 0.171 0.177 0.177 
Observations  251 251 251 251 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). *** Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). Note: t statistics in 
parentheses 	
6. Robustness checks
This section provides several additional analyses to con-
firm the validity and robustness of the findings. Firstly, al-
ternative models of earnings management are employed and
then the sample is partitioned by signed discretionary accru-
als.
6.1. Further earnings management models
In order to validate the power and robustness of our find-
ings, this research relies on other alternative metrics that
have been widely used in prior literature for calculating earn-
ings management, namely the Jones (1991) model and the
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995).
Table 5 documents the results of the GLS regression mod-
els, where the dependent variable is the discretionary ac-
cruals calculated by the Jones (1991) model (DACJ) and
the Modified Jones model (DACMJ) (Dechow et al., 1995).
Hence, it can be noted that both models present comparable
conclusions to those obtained with the Kothari et al. (2005)
model in Table 4. In particular, Table 5 reveals that the coef-
ficients of auditor size (AUDSIZE) and audit fees (AFEE) are
found to be negative and positive, respectively, and statist-
ically insignificant at all significance levels in both models.
These findings are similar than those showed in Table 4. In
addition, the results of control variables also remain similar
to those presented in Table 4. The goodness-of-fit (R-square)
is around 0.20 for both models.
Table 5
GLS regression results using additional discretionary accruals modelsTable 5: GLS regression results using additional discretionary accruals models 
Variables 
Column 1 
Jones Modified (1995) 
Column 2 
Jones Original (1991) 
AUDSIZE -0.004 -0.0102 (-0.29) (-0.68) 
AFEE 0.0503 0.0541 (1.67) (1.8) 
LEVERG 0.00046 0.000399 (1.15) (1.03) 
SIZE -0.0798*** -0.0792*** (-3.51) (-3.51) 
GROW 0.000841*** 0.000855*** (8.86) (9.10) 
ROA 0.00272* 0.00278* (2.29) (2.38) 
CONSTANT 0.440*** 0.424*** (4.29) (3.99) 
R2 0.204 0.199 
Observations 251 251 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed). *** Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). Note: t 
statistics in parentheses 	
6.2. Signed Accruals
Following prior research (Gul et al., 2009; Alali, 2011;
Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012; Albersmann and Hohenfels,
2017; Habbash and Alghamdi, 2017), besides employing the
absolute (unsigned) value of discretionary accruals, we also
analyzed the signed earnings management with the aim of
discovering possible different discretions practiced by man-
agers to engage in earnings management (Ashbaugh et al.,
2003; Jenkins et al., 2006). Therefore, the observations of
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the discretionary accruals were split into two groups: posit-
ive (income-increasing) discretionary accruals and negative
(income-decreasing) discretionary accruals.
In terms of independent variables, the findings for aud-
itor size (AUDSIZE) as well as for audit fees (AFEE) presen-
ted in Table 6 do not differ between both sub-samples (up-
wards or downwards earnings management) and remain un-
changed (statistically insignificant) compared to our main
results (Table 4).
With reference to the control variables, the coefficient of
size (SIZE) is negative and statistically significant in the pos-
itive discretionary accruals sub-sample and positive and stat-
istically significant in the negative discretionary accruals sub-
sample, implying that the larger firms are more likely to
manage earnings downwards. In addition, firms with higher
growth (GROW) are more averse to manage earnings down-
wards. Finally, Table 6 demonstrates that leverage (LEVERG)
has no impact on either direction on earnings management
compared to the documented outcomes in the main analysis.
Table 6
GLS regression results – signed accrualsTable 6: GLS regression results – signed accruals 
Variables 
Positive earnings management 
(increasing) DAC+ 
Negative earnings management (decreasing) 
DAC- 
Column 1 
DACKO 
Column 2 
DACMJ 
Column 3 
DACJ 
Column 1 
DACKO 
Column 2 
DACMJ 
Column 3 
DACJ 
AUDSIZE -0.00243 -0.00859 -0.00952 -0.00873 -0.0175 -0.00702 
(-0.14) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.643) (-0.94) (-0.34) 
AFEE 
0.0103 0.00792 0.00962 -0.0311 -0.00633 -0.00768 
(0.36) (0.24) (0.29) (-0.402) (-0.16) (-0.18) 
LEVERG 
0.000376 0.000803 0.000701 -0.000204 -0.00146 -0.0000264 
(1.4) (1.86) (1.61) (-0.703) (-0.25) (-0.04) 
SIZE 
-0.0350* -0.0589** -0.0636** 0.0797** 0.055 0.052 
(-2.47) (-2.80) (-3.02) (0.006) (1.77) (1.52) 
GROW 0.0104 0.00581 0.00679 -0.000669*** -0.000667*** -0.000675*** 
(1.62) (0.85) (0.84) (-5.90) (-6.03) (-5.72) 
ROA 
0.00145 0.00698*** 0.00660*** -0.00128 -0.000268 -0.0000851 
(1.08) (3.38) (3.38) (-0.311) (-0.23) (-0.07) 
CONSTANT 
0.257** 0.422*** 0.455*** -0.524*** -0.44** -0.420* 
(3.06) (3.31) (3.64) (-3.98) (-3.07) (-2.47) 
R2 0.332 0.39 0.376 0.243 0.212 0.201 
Observations 134 128 130 117 123 121 
Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*** Significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). Note: T-statistics in parentheses 	
7. Conclusions
Previous literature has shown that the role of auditing in
restricting earnings management practices is influenced by
both firm-level and country-level factors (Maijoor and Van-
straelen, 2006; Choi and Wong, 2007; Francis and Wang,
2008; Lin and Hwang, 2010). As Bao and Lewellyn (2017)
noted, in emerging markets both types of factors are dissim-
ilar from those in developed countries. This study aimed to
shed new light on the extent to which external auditing is cap-
able to restrict earnings management in a developing coun-
try, Jordan, whose cultural, economic, and institutional con-
text is very different frommost previously analyzed countries’
contexts (i.e. the Anglo-Saxon andWest-European countries).
To achieve this objective, this study investigated whether
some audit quality attributes (i.e. auditor size and audit fees)
have an impact on discretionary accruals, as a proxy of earn-
ings management, for a sample of industrial firms listed on
the ASE during the period 2012 – 2016.
The findings indicate that auditor size and audit fees have
no significant effect on earnings management. These find-
ings support the authors’ expectation that external auditing
in Jordan can function differently from the Western more-
developed contexts. This is arguably because of some aspects
that Jordan shares with other emerging markets, such as con-
centrated ownership structure, lower investor protection, a
small and relatively inefficient stock market, strong personal
relations between auditors and their clients, a low demand
for high-quality external audits, and a low appreciation of
the value of auditing.
However, certain particular features of the Jordanian in-
stitutional context can also have influenced on these find-
ings, namely cultural factors affecting the perception of aud-
itor independence and the way in which auditors understand
their work. Furthermore, given the low level of audit fees in
Jordan, which are comparatively much lower than those in
developed countries and even those in other countries in the
Middle East region, this study finds that audit fees do not
affect earnings quality. Consequently, audit fees have no in-
fluence on auditors’ behavior in relation to earnings manage-
ment, since their magnitude is low. Therefore, the findings
of this study present new evidence regarding the effect of the
level of audit fees on earnings management.
This study’s findings support the view that in emerging
markets, like Jordan, auditing may not be an efficient in-
ternal monitoring mechanism and, therefore, it can be said
that the prediction made by the agency theory about the role
of auditing in mitigating opportunistic earnings management
activities is not always accurate. Thus, this study adds to
the continuing discussion and controversy that surrounds the
role of external auditing in restricting earnings management
in different institutional, economic, and cultural contexts.
These findings can provide useful information to regulat-
ors and auditing standards-setters, both in Jordan and other
countries with a similar institutional setting, as they imply
that recent regulatory reforms in Jordan have not been effect-
ive in improving audit quality and strengthen auditor’s inde-
pendence in order to limit earnings management practices,
and the audit profession still suffers severe flaws. Therefore,
the findings have two important policy implications. On the
hand, the fact that auditors perform differently depending
on the strictness of the countries’ investor protection regime
should be considered when international audit standards,
heavily influenced by the US institutional context, are intro-
duced in emerging markets, because otherwise these stand-
ards could be ineffective. On the other hand, in the case of
Jordan, the low audit fees and the lack of demand for high-
quality audits should be taken into account in considering
any new reform aimed at strengthening the role of external
auditing in restricting earnings management.
Finally, the knowledge of the relation between audit qual-
ity and earnings management in Jordan is still relatively
low. This study extends and updates the limited empirical
evidence on this issue in the Jordan context. Moreover,
as the authors are aware, this study is the first one to ex-
plore the role of audit quality on restricting earnings manage-
ment in the period after activation of the Jordanian Corpor-
ate Governance Code of 2008 (previous studies, such as Al-
Mousawi and Al-Thuneibat, 2011, Al-Thuneibat et al., 2011,
and Alzoubi, 2016, were all based on older data). Thus, to
some extent, this study provides a test of the effect of such
a code on earnings management, and finds that significant
work is still to be done.
A number of limitations ought to be considered when ex-
plaining the findings. First, the paucity of information and
inconsistent reporting formats over Jordanian firms block
some input-based proxies for audit quality, such as industry-
specialist auditors or tenure. As a result, this study has only
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used two variables: audit size (Big Four versus non-Big Four)
and audit fees. Therefore, the association between audit
quality and earnings management in Jordan could be further
addressed in future research if such data become more avail-
able. Second, our results rely on the accuracy of discretionary
accruals as an appropriate proxy for earnings management.
Third, the findings may be somewhat limited by data avail-
ability. Finally, this study considers earnings management as
an opportunistic behavior which aims to mislead sharehold-
ers or any other stakeholders through misrepresentation or
masking true economic performance. Thus, interpretations
of the findings are limited to the opportunistic argument.
The aforementioned limitations do not undervalue the im-
portance of the results and valuable insights of this study, but
give a worthy platform for future investigation. Thus, a po-
tential avenue for future research could be to use other audit
quality proxies of audit firms, such as output-based prox-
ies (i.e. restatements or audit opinions). Future researchers
could also consider other corporate governance mechanisms
such as board of directors and audit committees in restrict-
ing earnings management in Jordan. Finally, future research
may also use other approaches to investigate this relation-
ship, for instance, using qualitative research methods.
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